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Abstract
The main task of this article is to assess the recent external debt dynamics in middle-income
economies and try to understand how this debt has evolved over time. Then, we intend to
shed light on the main hypothesis associated with the well-known “debt intolerance”
approach. According to this approach the propensity to default of some developing countries
is frequently associated with their history of default and inflation. Our empirical findings
suggest that the way developing economies borrow, that is, the debt denomination is still far
more important to explain the debt dynamics than the domestic weakness in accepting default
and fiscal avoidance.
Key-Words:  External Debt; Developing Countries; Debt Intolerance; Sustainability
Assessment.
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Resumo
O principal objetivo deste trabalho é analisar a recente dinâmica da divida externa em
economias de renda per capita média e tentar entender como essa dívida tem evoluído no
tempo. Nossa principal hipótese a ser testa diz respeito ao enunciado da abordagem conhecida
como “debt intolerance” (Reinhart, Rogoff e Savastano, 2002). De acordo com esta
abordagem a propensão ao default de algumas economias em desenvolvimento é
frequentemente associada com suas histórias de default e inflação. Nossos resultados
empíricos sugerem que o modo como tais economias tomam emprestado parece ser mais
importante para explicar a dinâmica da dívida externa de tais economias do que propriamente
seus possíveis frágeis sistemas financeiros e tendência em aceitar políticas fiscais mais
frouxas.
 Palavras-Chave:  Dívida externa, economias em desenvolvimento, debt intolerance,
sustentabilidade de dívida.
Classificação JEL: F34; F37; F41; C23.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Even though programs of debt restructuring took place in the late 1980s and in the
early 1990s, the total external debt has increased in most developing regions. Figure 1
shows the sizeable increase of the public and publicly guaranteed debt in all
developing economies around the world.  From 1990 to 2003, the total external debt
(public and publicly guaranteed) increased by 40%, while low income countries
experienced an increase of 47% and middle income countries debt increased by 25%.
Key debt indicators can be very contradictory and for many developing economies,
mainly for middle income economies, one may find relieving situations. Actually,
these debt indicators can show decreases in the external debt scaled to exports, and
the reason is close associated with increasing exports led by domestic currency
devaluation. As currency crises took place a few years ago one could barely predict
some real effect of exchange rate competitiveness on exports to some time ahead.
Concerns are addressed about both the rising in the total amount and the way the debt
has raised in the last decades.
According to Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003), default became a rule rather
than an exception in countries with weak financial intermediation and high tax
avoidance. In a very different perspective, Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza
(2003) associate the problem of the external debt in developing countries with the
“global imbalance” or more properly speaking emerging market economies suffer
from the original sin, because they are incapable of borrowing abroad in their own
currency, even domestically in long-term interest rate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two summarizes why some countries
borrow so much, according to the standpoint of the “debt intolerance” hypothesis. The
third section presents a model to analyze sustainability models in a critical condition
of external indebtedness. Econometrical evidence will be summed up in the fourth
section.
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Throughout the paper the analysis is conducted towards supporting the ideas that
external debt dynamics in developing countries remains the same well-known
theoretical derivation associated with its profile. This argument is rather associated
with the “original sin” than with the “debt intolerance” approach. Even though the
sustainability assessments provided by International Monetary Fund (IMF) are
worthy, they need to take into account specific attributes of the debt dynamics.
2. WHY SOME COUNTRIES BORROW SO MUCH?
According to Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003), the concept of “debt
intolerance” manifests itself under the extreme circumstances many emerging market
economies experience in terms of debt level that would seem manageable by
advanced country standards. They argue that “safe” external debt-to-GNP thresholds
for debt intolerant countries are low and that these thresholds depend on the history of
default and inflation. The key finding is that the debt intolerance showed by some
countries can be explained by a very small number of variables related to their
repayments and inflation history
1.
Why does the market repeatedly lend to debt-intolerant countries to a point where the
credit risk becomes significant, if serial default is such a pervasive phenomenon?
“Part of the reason may have to do with the pro-cyclical nature of the capital market,
which has repeatedly lent vast sums to emerging market economies in boom periods
(which are often associated with low returns in the industrial countries) only to
retrench when adverse shocks occur, producing painful ‘sudden stops’”. (Reinhart,
Rogoff and Savastano, 2003:7). But, the other part of their answer is associated with
the shortsightedness and complacence of both domestic governments and multilateral
institutions. In other words, during periods of international liquidity “governments
have often been too short-sighted (or too corrupt) to internalize the significant risks
that over borrowing produces over the longer term” and “the multilateral institutions
have been too complacent (or have had too little leverage) when loans were pouring
in” (Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano, 2003:7).
According to the “debt intolerance” approach some countries always borrow more
than they should and will then suffer domestic fiscal imbalance; as a consequence, if a
“sudden stop” occurs, they will default. And they do this because they do not protect
their domestic financial system
2.
In order to make practical the debt intolerance measurement, Reinhart, Rogoff and
Savastano (2003) focused on the indicator of sovereign debt called “Institutional
Investor’s Country Credit Ratings” (henceforth IIR) prepared by the Institutional
Investor
3. However, according to figure 2, it is hard to pinpoint the relationship
between the key indicator of external debt (PVD_GNI
4) and IIR. The correlation
coefficient
5 between PVD_GNI and IIR is 0.017. But, the correlation between
PVD_XGS and IIR is negative and relatively high (-0.23), which definitely does not
make sense. That is, it is not expected that low debt indicator is associated with high
probability of default on government debt obligation. Consequently, it indicates that it
is not easy to define debtor’s club and external debt intolerance regions through only
those two variables. Conversely, figure 3 shows the other way the investors can
analyze the country’s sovereign debt focusing on external vulnerability and it is4
reasonable to think about the positive relationship between high debt and strong
external imbalances.
According to the “debt intolerance” approach, the inflation history is used to predict
default. But, the inflation of the last eight years (from 1995 to 2002) is not associated
with the IIR. At first glance, there is a very practical reason to believe that there is
some relationship between inflation and sovereign risk. Certainly, countries suffering
unrelieved inflation show frequently high interest rates and then they become more
domestically indebted. Conversely, there is another reason to believe that this has
been a phenomenon, at least since 1990s, with low likelihood to be related to
increases in the external debt.  Figure 4 shows the inflation across regions, and they
were reduced to low levels even in developing countries where inflation is more
difficult to be controlled.
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But, why do countries without history of default attempt to avoid default for such a
long period of time? The authors’ answer of the “debt intolerance” approach is
associated with the interest that countries have in protecting their banking and
financing system. It means that weak financial intermediation in many serial
defaulters is associated with low penalty for defaulting. So, “The lower costs of
financial intermediation disruption that these countries face may induce them to
default at lower thresholds, further weakening their financial systems and
perpetuating the cycle”(p. 13)
6.
Additionally, do debt-intolerant countries really borrow too much? According to those
authors, at least from 1980s and 1990s, evidence shows that external borrowing was
often driven by shortsighted governments that were willing to take significant risks to
raise consumption temporarily, rather than to foster high-return investment projects.
“The fact that the gains from borrowing come quickly, whereas the increased risks of
default is borne only in the future, tilts shortsighted governments towards excessive
debt”(p. 13).
Summing up, some countries borrow more than they should, and they borrow more
because they are unable to find an alternative domestic source to support their
imbalance. They also can live borrowing and defaulting as a way of life without
focusing attention on protecting their weak banking and financial system. The
external debt dynamics over time, specially indexed to foreign currency and
international interest rates, is only the expression of the way they can borrow more;
international investors lend more during exuberant financial cycles and earn higher
returns than they would earn in developed economies.
Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) are probably right when they emphasize the
fact that default is a cyclical phenomenon and most likely serial defaulters are more
prone to default during “sudden stops” in capital flows than the non-defaulters. The
perception of the international investors is an important variable and can be expressed
in ratings and credit risk measurements. It is also important that the history of
inflation matters to build foreign investors’ perceptions.6
But, what can be said about the role played by other factors such as the degree of
dollarization and the maturity structure of the debt?  Do these factors help to build the
perception of foreign investors? That is, not only the degree of the external debt, but
also its profile can be important to grade countries according to credit risk
measurements. Is it fair to relate a country’s debt profile to domestic institutional
weakness? In other words, why do some countries borrow the way they borrow?
3. DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS
Now it is important to understand the situation that emerging market economies can
experience when they are considered debt-intolerant countries and analyze the way
they can deal with their debt in order to avoid default.
According to the standard debt sustainability analysis:
(1)  ) ( ) ( )] ( 1 [ ) 1 ( t TB t D t r t D − + = +
where ) (t D is the country’s external debt at time t, TB is its trade balance, and r is the
interest paid by the country on its external debt. In steady-state one can express the
following relationship:
(2) ) / )( ( / Y D g r Y TB − =
where  Y TB/ is the steady-state ratio of the trade balance to output needed to stabilize
the external debt ratio at  Y D/ .
To be closer to the recent movement of the external debt, three different changes in
the expression 1 can be proposed. First of all, the current account instead of trade
balance; second, as the majority of external debts in developing countries are U.S.
Dollars denominated, the debt denomination is incorporated in the model. Hence, not
only the interest rate matters, but also the U.S. Dollar variability is taken into account
in the expression; and, finally, the model weighs the participation of the U.S. Dollar-
denominated external debt. Then, the equation 1 can be expressed as:
(1a)   ) ( ) ( ) )]( ( ). ( 1 [ ) 1 ( t CA t D w t e t r t D USD − + = +
where e is the U.S. exchange rate in terms of an international basket of currencies;
USD w  is the weight of the U.S. Dollar-Denominated external debt in the total debt, and
CA is the Current Account. Figure 5 shows the important role played by this
component of the external debt when, in the early 1990s, the U.S. Dollar-denominated
debt averaged 40% of the total external debt in developing economies and in 2002
represented more than 60%.7
Figure 5: Developing Countries: Currency Composition of the Long-Term External Debt (1990-
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Source: World Bank (2005).
After simple manipulation, the steady-state expression 2 can be written as following:
(2a) ) / )]( 1 )( [( / Y D w g e r Y CA + − + =
Taking into account the exogenous shocks, such as confidence, political and terms-of-
trade shocks,  ) (t ζ ,  (2a) can be expressed as a stochastic process as following
7:
(2b) ) ( ) / )]( 1 )( [( / t Y D w g e r Y CA ζ + + − + =
Figure 6 illustrates both situations for the “standard approach” of the external debt
sustainability analysis and the other one added with the problem of foreign currency
denomination of the external debt. According to expression 2 some countries can
manage their external debt by implementing sustainable current account surplus
(relative to GDP), as shown in the initial equilibrium A. But, once the interest rate is
an endogenous variable (the higher the external debt, scaled to GDP or to exports, the
higher the interest rate for future debt renegotiations)
8, the model states that after the
equilibrium A, the higher the debt-to-GDP (or debt-to-exports) is, the higher the
interest rate for futures payments will be.
The consequence is straightforward: the country must present very high current
account surplus related to GDP. However, even if the country can increase its current
account to GDP, it will not be insulated from more increases in its external debt, once
most of its external debt can be foreign-currency denominated. In this context, there
are many mechanisms to be revealed. First, if a country has elasticity to increase the
current account
9, maybe because of either trade performance associated with
depreciation in the domestic currency, or because the external income has increased
faster than the domestic income. Second, and consequently, the international currency
denominated external debt would have increased.
This especially dramatic dynamics of the external debt might take place only because
the country’s initial level of debt (scaled by GDP or exports) may already have
exceeded, or be close to exceeding the D/Y* level. Needless to say, non-anticipated
external shocks in the foreign exchange rate and international interest rate, besides the8
shocks in term-of-trade and domestic inflation, cause changes in the steady-state
equilibrium, from CA/Y* to CA/Y*’, as shown in figure 5. On the CA/Y*’ curve, with
the same initial value of the external debt (D/Y*), the country must have a higher
current account surplus, and, it is very likely to move on a steep curve and it therefore
has to obtain a much higher current account surplus over time. However, some
countries, mainly developing ones, seek more revenue from inelastic sources and
they, therefore, borrow more abroad in foreign currency. During periods of
exuberating capital flight they can probably finance their external imbalance, but
when “sudden stop” takes place they default.
Figure 6 - External Debt Dynamics for Debt-Intolerant Countries
Finally, it is important to consider the rapid growth of the domestic government debt
in the 1990s. It is fair to say, according to the experience in Brazil, Argentina and
Turkey, that the domestic government debts are denominated either to foreign
currencies or to some short-term interest rates. “These trends suggest that domestic
debt intolerance can manifest itself in a manner similar to external debt intolerance.”



















Discussing the effects of debt intolerance for debt sustainability analysis, it is
necessary to recognize that the interest rate paid on debt is an endogenous variable,
which depends on the debt-to-output (or debt-to-exports) ratio. The interest rate on
debt to private creditors can increase with the debt level. Additionally, sustainability
analyses need to take into account that the initial level of debt may already have
exceeded.
According to this standard debt sustainability model, emerging market economies can
experience difficulties in overcoming external imbalances and therefore they default.
However, they default not exactly because of their history of default and inflation,
even the inflationary process remains a great concern. They default because of the
way they borrow. In a prospective analysis even if they borrow less they can default;
even if they present commitment to keep the inflation at low levels, they can default;
and, finally, even if they defend low exchange rate volatility
10, default can be their
destiny.
4. ECONOMETRICAL FINDINGS: A PANEL MODEL
We first estimate the equation as follow:
it it it it i it Z X Y Y ε β β β α + + + + = − 1 1 1 0                                                                  (3)
where:  it Y is the external debt measured by PPGD (Public and Publicly Guaranteed
Debt), sometimes in absolute values, or in terms of growth rates, or related to GDP
11;
it X is the vector of explanatory variables that might express size and development
level of the monetary and financial sector
12, such as domestic credit, market
capitalization, besides inflation, monetary policy (five-year moving average of the
inflation), ratio monetary base to GDP and consequently the credibility of monetary
policy
13;  it Z is the vector of explanatory variables that can express the debt profile,
such as the maturity structure
14, the average interest rate
15 and the currency-
denomination
16 of the debt, as well as variables to control the external vulnerability
problems and foreign liquidity, such as current account deficit (or relative to GDP),
foreign exchange reserves to imports, real exchange rate misalignment and exchange
rate regimes
17 and external debt interest payments to exports. Most variables in the
data set (see table 1) were obtained from World Bank’s databases (World Economic
Indicators and Global Development Finance On line)
18.
The functional form (3) is a dynamic model. As known, when T is small and the
model is dynamic (i.e. includes a lagged dependent variable), the estimation bias can
be substantial (see Nickell, 1981). Methods to cope with such dynamic panel data
models are particularly the GMM-type estimators of Arellano and Bond (1991),
Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998) and also the Anderson and
Hsiao (1992) estimators. Modeling dynamics typically involves including a lagged
value of the dependent variable as an explanatory variable. Fixed effects (FE) and
random effects (RE) modelsare biased in this case
19. A common choice of instrument
is  2 − t Y  used as an instrumental variable for  1 − ∆ t Y  as suggested by instrument variable
estimation (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981).10
However, in Blundell and Bond (1998), in dynamic panel data models where the
autoregressive parameter is moderately large and the number of time series
observations is moderately small, exactly as our dataset, the widely used linear
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator obtained from first differencing
has been found to have large finite sample bias and poor precision in simulation
studies. Lagged levels of the series provide weak instruments for first differences in
this case. (see Blundell and Bond, 1998, p. 115).
Arellano, Bond, and Bover developed one and two step general methods of moments
(GMM) estimators for panel data analysis. GMM is usually robust to deviations of the
underlying data generation process to violations of heteroskedasticity and normality,
insofar as they are asymptotically normal but they are not always the most efficient
estimators.  When estimating dynamic models for our equation (see table 2) we are
therefore concerned with the transformations that allow the use of lagged endogenous
variable as instruments in the transformed equation. In this case, we procedure a two-
step GMM estimation, when one-lagged real our dependent variables is treated as
endogenous variable and two-lagged the dependent variables e as additional
instrument variable
20.
Table 2 shows the empirical results. We run several variants of the expression 3. First
of all, there is strong evidence cross-country, for the period 1990-2002, that high GDP
is positively correlated with high external debt; second, even statistically non
significant, high growth rates in external debt are related with lowers growth rates in
GDP; third, there is no evidence proving any sort of reasonable relation between
growth of the external debt and either inflation or the size of the monetary and
financial system
21.
It very important to highlight that it was run the same equations using different
measurements that express same reasonable idea of monetary policy credibility: the
inflation measured by CPI and the variance of inflation measured by five-year moving
average and were reported only the best results in terms of t-test statistics and/or
coefficient signal. We also preceded exclusion and restrictions tests to evaluate
restrict model against an irrestrict one, according to F-statistic. Variance of inflation
was tested because some countries can mantain the high interest rate longer with the
intention to build credibility because they recently had undergone hyper-inflation
episodes.
Fourth, high current account deficit to GDP is statistically related to changes in the
external debt, which suggests that there is some evidence in favor of the external
vulnerability as an important sign of highly indebtedness countries. Taking the debt to
GDP, it was run other set of equations. Once more, inflation (or variance of inflation)
and the size of the monetary system were not statistically significant at all, what
means that countries that have experienced high inflation are not the same with high
external debt; additionally, the size of the monetary system is not statistically
significant, even the negative sign can convey the idea that the country with large
monetary system is less indebted.11
It was tested if severely indebted countries have experienced pegged exchange
regimes and there is no empirical evidence in favor of this idea. It means that the
choice of the pegged exchange rate regimes and the subsequent collapse in the
developing economies did not help to predict the external debt dynamics, even though
it can be narrowly associated with domestic federal debt and default of this debt.
Finally, considering the variables that can express the debt profile (maturity structure,
interest rate and currency-denomination), it is absolutely fair to say that all those
explanatory variables are statistically significant to explain the external debt dynamics
during the 1990s in the developing countries.
 Consequently, it is fair to remark that
22:
1.  If the debt intolerance approach were right, would be able to see some
significant and negative estimated parameters for the inflation, variance of
inflation, domestic credit (or scaled by GDP), market capitalization (or scaled
by GDP), or interactions of these variables such as the Monetary and Financial
System. We know that debt intolerance cannot be reduced to this analysis, but
it supports the ideas that debt intolerant countries operate under weak
monetary and financial system and under inflation, and that their governments
have no concerns about probability to default.
2.  It was not reported any evidence regarding tax systems and most importantly,
the debt intolerance approach can be correct about the fact that countries
where tax system avoidance is high tend to have greater difficulty to pay the
debt. However, if the profile of the external debt is so important, according to
the empirical findings, even the government would face the relatively elastic
tax sources to honor debt payments, it would not be enough once the
developing countries’ debts face high foreign currency volatility and higher
international interest rate to pay debts than their domestic interest rate.
3.  So, even with tremendous effort from domestic authorities of the developing
countries in order to improve output growth, to build credible monetary policy
and/or to strengthen the tax system, the external debt dynamics ingrains in the
foreign-currency denomination and in the concentration of small quantities of
currencies associated with short-tem maturity structures and, therefore, it may
cause by themselves and no longer default.
4.  Even if we have not directly tested the main original sin hypothesis, that
explains why some countries cannot borrow abroad in domestic currency, even
domestically for short term, we presented a lot of empirical inquiries
concerned with the way the developing countries borrow abroad and how
important this is for the debt dynamics. It seems that the some countries
default because of the way they borrow and according to the original sin
arguments the way they borrow is strongly associated with the global
imbalance and causes, therefore, currency mismatches. In other worlds, the
original sin hypothesis can be considered the alternative to the null hypothesis
(debt intolerance).
5.  Finally, Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) are apparently right when they
argue that there are some critical shortcomings in the standard sustainability
exercises and the recognition of other factor, such as the degree of
dollarization, short-term interest rates and the maturity structure of a country’s
debt, are actually different manifestations of the same underlying institutional
weaknesses. But, if the authors are concerned about the domestic institutions12
this research moved far more towards international institutions, that is,
monetary international institutions that lend to developing countries.
5.  FINAL REMARKS
The empirical evidence presented in this work is comprehensive and
straightforward in order to show reservations about the hypothesis supported by
Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003). The inflation (or variance of inflation)
and the size of the monetary-financial system barely explain the sovereign debt
dynamics since 1990.  There is no evidence in favor of the idea that debt intolerant
countries are not concerns about their financial system and they are not the same
living with high inflation rates, even though developing countries show higher
inflation rates than developed ones.
The external debt dynamics preserve the traditional foundations ingrained in the
profile in terms of maturity structure (predominantly short-term debts), interest
rates paid to its obligations (most of them are higher than the domestic interest
rates) and, last but not least, the foreign-currency denominated debt, and as well-
known the US dollar can reach more the 80% of the total debt. From this last
feature derivates the idea that the external debt can not be controllable only by
domestic governments. That means directly that even under extraordinary
economic growth rates and credible monetary and fiscal policies, developing
economies can not avoid US dollar volatility. More than symptoms of the history
of default and inflation, the way the developing economies borrow abroad is
remarkable. They definitely suffer from original sin since they have inability to
borrow in their own currencies.13
Table 1 - Variables, Descriptions and Sources
Name of the Variable Description Source
PPGD Public and Publicly Guaranteed Debt,
US$
Global Development Finance
GDP Gross Domestic Product, constant,
1995, US$
World Economic Indicators
GDPgrowth Growth rate of Gross Domestic Product
(constant, 1995, US$)
World Economic Indicators
INFLATION Growth rate of Consumer Index Price
(1995 = 100)
World Economic Indicators
VAR INFL Variance of Inflation measured by the
moving average of the Inflation
World Economic Indicators
DOMESTIC CREDIT Domestic Credit Provided by Banking
Sector (US Dollar Total or % of GDP).
World Economic Indicators
MONEY Money and Quasi Money (US Dollar
Total or as % of GDP)
World Economic Indicators
MONETARY SYSTEM Monetary System measured by
multiplication of Domestic Credit and
Money and Quasi Money (US Dollar
Total or as % of GDP)
World Economic Indicators
FINANCIALSYSTEM Size and development of the financial
system measured by market
capitalization (also known as market
value) that is the share price times the
number of shares outstanding. Listed
domestic companies are the
domestically incorporated companies
listed on the country's stock exchanges
at the end of the year.
Standard & Poor's, Emerging




Measured by the common factor
between the variables monetary system
and financial system.
World Bank and Standard &
Poor's, Emerging Stock Markets
Fact book and supplemental
S&P data.
CURRENT ACCOUNT Current Account Balance, current, US$ World Economic Indicators
RES_IMPORTS Total Reserves in Months of Imports World Economic Indicators
EXCHANGE RATE
REGIMES
Measures of exchange rate regimes




REER Real and Effective Exchange Rate
Index (1995 = 100)
World Economic Indicators
INTEREST RATE Average Interest Rate (Annual %) Global Development Finance
MATURITY Average Maturity (Years) Global Development Finance
DENOMINATION Currency Composition of Long Term
Debt (U.S. Dollars %)
Global Development Finance14
Table 2: Empirical Results (1990-2002)








































3/ 702 686 694 689 685 665
No. of Parameters 58 58 58 58 59 60
Wald (joint)
 5/ 30.67[0.000] 1.910[0.167] 0.267[0.605] 1.272[0.259] 1.767[0.413] 441.9[0.000]
AR (1) Test

































4/ 689 693 683 682 676 676
No. of Parameters 58 58 58 58 58 59
Wald (joint)
5/ 0.451[0.502] 0.118[0.731] 0.275[0.600] 0.0012[0.972] 1.339[0.24] 0.6011[0.740]
AR (1) Test






















































4/ 618 451 587 681 668 656
No. of Parameters 54 38 56 59 59 60
Wald (joint)
 5/ 1.097[0.295] 0.295[0.586] 3.808 [0.433] 10.35[0.016] 11.59[0.09] 12.58[0.014]
AR (1) Test
6/ 3.316[0.001] -0.977[0.338] 3.525 [0.000] 3.920[0.000] 3.536[0.00] 3.481[0.000]
Notes:
2/ All estimations were run by using robust standard error. T-test statistics in parentheses.
3/ We reported only Monetary and Financial System, instead of reporting Monetary System and/or Financial System because it
was our better results.
4/ Unbalanced panel with 57 individuals, longest time series with 13 and shortest time series with 8 (1990-2002).
5/ Wald (joint) X
2(2).
6/ AR(1) test N(0,1).15
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Footnotes:
                                                
1 From historical perspective, default can become a way of life, and, from 1824 to 2001, countries like
Brazil and Argentina were either in default or undergoing restructuring a quarter of the time, Venezuela
and Colombia almost 40 percent of the time, and Mexico for almost half of all the years since its
independence.
2 The authors of the “original sin” approach (Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza, 2003) question that
the debt-intolerance approach suggests that default on external debt may weaken a country’s tax system
by encouraging capital flight and tax avoidance. However, they report no regressions relating these
facts.
3 The Institutional Investor Rating (IIR) is compiled twice a year and is based on information provided
by economists and sovereign risk analysts at leading global banks and securities firms. The ratings
grade each country on a scale from 0 to 100, with a rating of 100 given to those countries perceived as
having the lowest change of defaulting on their government debt obligations.
4 PVD_GNI is the Prevent Value of Debt Service to GNI and PVD_XGS is the Present Value of Debt
Service to Exports.
5 We calculated Pearson’s correlation coefficient and in this case the value of the correlation does not
depend on the specific measurement units used.
6 The mechanism also takes into account the tax system in a capital flight context. Countries where tax
avoidance is high tend to have greater difficulty to fulfill debt payments, “forcing governments to seek
more revenue from relatively inelastic tax sources, in turn exaggerating flight and avoidance. Default
amplifies and ingrains this cycle” (p. 13).
7 As previously discussed, Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) measure the “debt intolerance”
focusing on two indicators: the sovereign debt rating, reported by Institutional Investors, and the
external debt-to-GNP ratio (or alternatively, the external debt-to-exports ratio). “Other factors”, such as
dollarization, indexation and maturity of the country’s debt are different aspects of the same underlying
institutional weaknesses. Therefore, the sustainability assessment could not be worth.17
                                                                                                                                           
8 “Because the interest rate on debt to private creditors can rise very sharply with the level of debt, a
trajectory that may seem marginally sustainable according to standard calculations may in fact be much
more problematic when debt intolerance is taken into account”. Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003:
41),
9 However, developing countries are, generally, treated as small economies that cannot alter the
international market.
10 According to Calvo and Reinhart (2002), the exchange rate volatility might be lower than the interest
rate volatility because emerging market economies can suffer from the “fear of floating”.
11 It is very important to highlight that in order to avoid the dependence problem between explanatory
and dependent variables, when the total external debt (herein Public and Publicly Guaranteed Debt) is
related to GDP, the explanatory variables are used in their absolute values, such as Domestic Credit,
Money M2 and Quasi-Money, Current Account, as well as combinations using these variables were
calculated from their absolute values.
12 According to Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003:13) “weak financial intermediation in many
serial defaulters lowers their penalty to default”. Then, domestic credit provided by banking system
and/or market capitalization can actually offer us a proxy of financial intermediation in domestic
monetary and financial systems.
13 It is expected that low inflation and tight monetary policy is symptom of credible central banks.
14 Average maturity represents the average maturity for all new public and publicly guaranteed loans
contracted during the year. To obtain the average, the maturity for all public and publicly guaranteed
loans has been weighted by the amounts of the loans. Public debt is an external obligation of a public
debtor, including the national government, a political subdivision (or an agency of either), and
autonomous public bodies. Publicly guaranteed debt is an external obligation of a private debtor that is
guaranteed for repayment by a public entity. (Global Development Finance: World Bank, 2004).
15 Interest rate represents the average interest rate on all new public and publicly guaranteed loans
contracted during the year. To obtain the average, the interest rates for all public and publicly
guaranteed loans have been weighted by the amounts of the loans. (Global Development Finance:
World Bank, 2004).
16 The percentage of external long-term debt contracted in U.S. dollars for the low- and middle-income
countries. Long-term external debt is defined as debt that has an original or extended maturity of more
than one year and that is owed to nonresidents and repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services.
(Global Development Finance: World Bank, 2004).
17 It was used De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes classification provided by Bulbula & Ókter-Rube
(2002). According to this classification a country can be ranked from 1 (Another currency as legal
tender) to 13 (independently floating). As the dataset ends in 2001, estimations with the variable
exchange rate regimes used data from 1990 to 2001.
18 Annex 2 shows box-plot of the main variables used in our estimations.
19 FE transformation subtracts each unit’s average value from each observation and, consequently, each
transformed value of the lagged dependent variable for that unit involves all the error terms associated
with that unit, and so is contemporaneously correlated with the transformed error. Things are even
worse for RE because a unit’s random intercept appears directly as an element of the composite error
term as a determinant of the lagged value of the dependent variable.
20 It is important to highlight that unit root tests were run, but not reported for convenience. They are
available upon request.18
                                                                                                                                           
21 Three different data were collected in order to catch on the size and the development level (financial
intermediation) of the monetary-financial systems across countries. On one hand, concerning with the
monetary system, there are the variables: the domestic credit (or scaled to GDP) and the M2 to GDP (or
only M2); on the other hand, to take into account the financial system level there is the market
capitalization (or scaled to GDP) provided by Standard and Poor’s.  Afterwards, the mixed variable
“Monetary and Financial System” was calculated by multiplying domestic credit with market
capitalization. The author believes that the variable M2 to GDP (or only M2) can also be used as the
proxy of monetary policy, but we would rather use only Inflation (or variance of inflation) because
monetary market equilibrium can be fairly expressed by the inflation.
22 The more difficult issue with these estimations is in considering the problem of causality mainly
when involving variables such as debt, maturity structure, denomination and interest rate. There is a
natural tendency to believe that high interest rate (low maturity or foreign-currency-denominated debt)
paid as debt obligations is caused by the debt amount and, at the same time, high interest rates (low
maturity or foreign-currency-denominated debt) cause enlargement in the debt. This discussion became
popular in several economies that default their domestic debt or had presented high default probability,
such as Brazil and Argentina. Some authors could prove that each hit in the interest rate in order to
smooth the capital inflows caused enlargement in domestic debt and hence stressed the investors to ask
for a higher interest rate to keep domestic t-bills in their portfolios. At first glance, the simple way to
test the potential bi-directional causality is to run the equations by OLS taking all variables as
endogenous and using lagged variables as regressors. This could allow us to test whether, after by
controlling for past y, past x helps to forecast yt, which is widely known as Granger causality. However,
Finkel (1995) indicated the limits of OLS regression and because of the problem of “reciprocal
causation” it would be highly recommended to use “instrumental variables” or Two Stage Least
Squares analysis, even panel designs are a powerful means of estimating reciprocal causal effects.
Others problems come up while we are deciding about the “instrumental variables” (Wooldridge,
2002). But, most importantly, even dynamic panel designs are concerned only with taking into account
the lagged dependent variable, but our problem when we are talking about causality is not definitely
addressed to estimate autocorrelation model (see Hsiao, 1995:chapter 4).